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Biometric research is directed increasingly towards Wearable Biometric Systems (WBS) for user authentication
and identification. However, prior to engaging in WBS research, how their operational dynamics and design
considerations differ from those of Traditional Biometric Systems (TBS) must be understood. While the current
literature is cognizant of those differences, there is no effective work that summarizes the factors where
TBS and WBS differ, namely, their modality characteristics, performance, security and privacy. To bridge
the gap, this paper accordingly reviews and compares the key characteristics of modalities, contrasts the
metrics used to evaluate system performance, and highlights the divergence in critical vulnerabilities, attacks
and defenses for TBS and WBS. It further discusses how these factors affect the design considerations for
WBS, the open challenges and future directions of research in these areas. In doing so, the paper provides a
big-picture overview of the important avenues of challenges and potential solutions that researchers entering
the field should be aware of. Hence, this survey aims to be a starting point for researchers in comprehending
the fundamental differences between TBS and WBS before understanding the core challenges associated with
WBS and its design.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Biometrics is a field of science which deals with the exploitation of unique, identifiable and quanti-
tatively measurable characteristics of humans in order to authenticate and/or identify them [181].
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Fig. 1. Block diagram for the system model of a typical TBS.
Over the years, pattern recognition and machine learning algorithms have found immense signifi-
cance in user authentication. A hardware-software-based technology that applies such algorithms
to human biometrics for authentication and, more recently, identification, fall under the class
called biometric systems. Although biometric devices are used more commonly, biometric systems
has been used in this paper to emphasize that the scope of study is beyond the physical device
itself, and considers communications and other applications that use the data from the individual
devices. Traditionally deployed as standalone systems, the biometric systems require separate,
mutually exclusive "enrollment" and "authentication" phases [31]. Figure 1 illustrates the system
model of traditional biometric systems (TBS). During enrollment, the user registers their traits or
"modalities" as a template, created by selecting and extracting specific features from the sample
recorded by sensor(s), such that it is enough to uniquely identify that user [192]. Their identity and
corresponding template are then stored in the database.
At this point, security of template becomes critical, as they cannot be revoked once the database
is compromised. Owing to plenty of additive noise common during measurement, hashing the
template is counter-productive [199]. There are many template protection methods like secure
sketch schemes whose strength is measured by the average min-entropy of the original template
given the secure sketch [200], fuzzy commitment scheme based on binary error-correcting codes
[108], and the use of mutual information to measure dishonesty among users [45]. The Informa-
tion Technology Laboratory (ITL) of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
recommends standards for biometric data exchange, system accuracy and interoperability [213].
Another class of systems are emerging, referred to in this paper as wearable biometric systems
(WBS), which are miniaturized, mobile, flexible, comfortable, less invasive, and aesthetically pleasing.
It is worth noting that WBS also come under another broader group, the wearable devices, which
also include token and smartcards. However, this paper focuses only on WBS. TBS and WBS ensure
user security in different ways.
• TBS consider each modality of the user as a separate entity while WBS consider the entire
user (along with all of their individual modalities) as one [152]
• TBS can be optionally connected to the Internet, whileWBS are inherently online, exploiting
the principles of Internet of Everything (IoE) [178]
• The authentication and identification processes for TBS are static and user-initiated while
for WBS are dynamic and autonomous
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Fig. 2. Flowchart showing the outline of this paper.
• While traditional modalities such as fingerprints, gait, motor, iris, and retina can be inte-
grated into wearables using less-invasive sensors embedded in eyewear, waist-belts, etc.,
modalities considered invasive in TBS such as ECG, EEG, and Electromyogram (EMG)
could be less invasive in WBS domain
• Threats, attacks and defense landscapes for TBS is very different from those for WBS,
considering they have different operating dynamics, characteristics and context
• While TBS are widely used in research institutes, hospitals, libraries, airports and universi-
ties, WBS currently find their use more in healthcare and personal fitness than in security
[129]
It is clear that the future of biometric systems research is geared towards WBS, especially factors
like modality characteristics, performance, security and privacy, and how they impact system
design and operation. However, prior to looking deeper into this area, it is important to better
understand the differences between TBS and WBS highlighted above. To this end, the paper makes
the following three key contributions: 1) Summarize and compare TBS and WBS in terms of
the factors identified above and discuss how they contribute to the differences listed earlier; 2)
Contribute to the literature by reviewing and summarizing observations of how the modality
characteristics, evaluation metrics and security impact the future design solutions for WBS; and
3) Present important open challenges and future research directions in biometric systems that
researchers should pay attention to. Hence, this survey is one of the first efforts in summarizing
the research conducted beyond the widely explored TBS, and serves as a strong starting point for
researchers entering/in interrelated fields.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows based on the outline illustrated by Figure 2. Section
2 introduces WBS, their system model, and Wireless Body Area Networks (WBANs). It also sum-
marizes various products in the market that leverage the technology. A comprehensive summary
of the different key characteristics of various WBS modalities is tabulated and discussed in Section
3. Section 4 reviews various metrics to evaluate the performance of TBS and WBS. Metrics for
WBS are summarized in contrast with those of TBS. The threats, attacks and defenses for TBS and
WBS are reviewed in Section 5. Attacks are summarized based on whether they target the modality,
technology or both to provide a cohesive organization of the literature. Defenses available against
the surveyed attacks are also presented. A brief discussion on how the modality characteristics,
performance evaluation metrics, security and privacy affect future design solutions for WBS is
discussed in Section 6. While Section 7 presents the open research challenges and future directions
for research in the area of WBS, Section 8 concludes the survey by summarizing the key findings.
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2 WEARABLE BIOMETRIC SYSTEMS (WBS)
Today, wearable applications quantify and personalize every action and movement undertaken
by users in order to monitor their health and upgrade their lifestyles. However, in the context of
security, the complexity faced by attackers increases multi-fold when such wearable applications
are networked to form a WBAN, with many independent, body-friendly and reliably accurate
sensors measuring and sharing data to yield a composite template. In tomorrow’s fast-paced world
where multiple devices are capable of interacting with each other, such dynamic and self-reliant
security technologies will be required. Companies like Nymi, Google, Motorola, Apple, and Fitbit
are releasing wearable devices like heart-rate monitors, physical fitness trackers, smartwatches,
mobile operating systems, assisted living, elder-care, ambient-assisted living, remote automotive
and home appliance control, and even navigation control [1, 43]. This implies there is a strong
future in WBS security for user authentication and identification.
WBS also double up as "virtual keys" that people use to protect their sensitive assets. Their
sensors are tasked with data acquisition, information communication, and decision making with
little to no user intervention [118]. Additionally, the nodes of WBS can be implanted, surface-
mounted, or even invisible [77]. While surface-mounted WBS are in the form of Smartwatch [122],
Fitbit [137], MOTOACTV [4] and Jawbone UP, implanted or embedded WBS have also started
making appearances in global markets. Invisible WBS, however, are still nascent in terms of their
commercial availability, although two of the leading biometric garment companies, OMSignal and
Hexoskin, have launched shirts and garments designed with specially fabricated textiles made of
sensors that collect and visualize body statistics in real-time [150]. WBAN is discussed in Section
2.1. Section 2.2 describes the system model for WBS, while Section 2.3 details the products available
in the market that use WBS.
2.1 Wireless Body Area Network (WBAN)
A central notion to WBS is WBAN. Wearable sensors, implanted or surface-mounted or invisible,
constitute WBAN with a typical range of 1 to 2 meters around the body. WBAN is derived from
"Wireless Personal Area Network (WPAN)", a term coined by Zimmerman in 2001 when he studied
the effect of electronics brought near human body [221]. With improvements in Microelectrome-
chanical System (MEMS), data analytics and wireless communications, sensors have seen successive
improvements with respect to reliability and robustness [130]. The data collected in real-time by
these sensors is communicated to a sink, which could be smartphones, Personal Digital Assistants
(PDAs) or Personal Computers (PCs). The collected data is fused, processed, and analyzed to offer
personalization, authentication and/or identification [63].
Wearable sensors are pervasive in nature. As identified in [59], a pervasive wearable is a colony
of biometric sensors, more formally called "passive biometrics" that is unobtrusively measurable
(non-invasive) and has maximal independence. They are auto-configured and do not need human
intervention during enrollment. However, due to this reason, data collected by them is usually more
than that collected by active biometrics like TBS. In addition, passive biometric sensors should
be able to discover their peers within the same body, distinguish between those that belong to
other bodies in their range, maintain secure communication, and identify the individual to whom
they belong. They must also have small size and lean form-factor, and be energy-efficient and
independent of positioning with respect to their target organ [79].
A typical WBAN, shown in Figure 3, is an interconnection of multiple independent wearable
sensors, each of which measure specific signals from a modality included but not limited to be
one of the following: brainwaves associated with stimuli, iris structure [30], retinal patterns [194],
vocal resonance while speaking prerecorded phrases [149, 195], skull conduction in response to
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Fig. 3. Block diagram of a typical WBAN with wearable sensor and sink nodes.
audio waves propagating within the head [184], signals from the heart [23, 180], vein pattern on
the underside of the skin, gait while walking or striding [64, 81], signals generated by muscles
in motion [[201], Mechanomyograph (MMG) signals generated by muscles upon activation [25],
fingerprint patterns [57], readings of pressure applied by fingertips when holding objects like pens,
car keys, steering wheel, computer mouse, door handle, etc., patterns from signature and body odor
[135], and Photoplethysmograph (PPG) denoting the absorption of light through a body part in
accordance with heartrate pulses [53, 123].
In WBAN, each sensor is termed a "node". The network itself can be scaled by connecting more
nodes on/in the body. These nodes use wireless protocols to communicate among themselves and
are coordinated by an on/in-body master "sink", forming a star topology, or communicate among
themselves and independently connect to an off-body sink, forming a star-mesh hybrid topology
[9, 72, 134, 203]. The protocols for communication between WBAN nodes and sink require low
power communication protocols since sensors run on batteries. The IEEE 802.15.6 is considered as
the primary standard that defines the Medium Access Control (MAC) architecture for in- and on-
body wireless communications [3]. According to the standard, every node and sink has a Physical
(PHY) layer (constituting a narrowband, ultra-wideband and human body communication PHY
layers) and a MAC sublayer [131]. The MAC Service Data Units (MSDUs) are transferred from the
MAC client layer to the MAC sublayer through the MAC Service Access Point (SAP). The MAC
frames are then transferred to the PHY layer through the PHY SAP. The reverse happens at the
receiving end, which would be a sink in a star topology, or a node/sink in a star-mesh hybrid
topology. Network and Application layers provide configuration, routing and management, and
functional requirements, respectively [15, 16].
Standard protocols for WBAN MAC communication such as ZigBee-MAC, Baseline-MAC
(BMAC), SPARE-MAC, T-MAC and D-MAC have been widely used to implement WBANs, which ac-
count for traffic resolution, collision contingencies, energy-saving, auto-configuration, throughput,
and delay [113]. MAC layers employ Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) and its hybrid variants
such as λ-MAC, and A-MAC [165, 179]. Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance
(CSMA/CA) technologies are also used for energy-efficient communication through sleep schedul-
ing, high channel utilization and low latency [188]. A Low-Energy Adaptive Clustering Hierarchy
(LEACH) routing protocol was presented to uniformly distribute energy load among WBAN nodes.
This method is a significant attempt towards reducing energy dissipation through randomization,
and also supports scalability, adaptiveness, and robustness [94]. WBAN communication should
be cognizant of electromagnetic wave diffraction due to the continuous absorption and reflection
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Fig. 4. System model of a typical Wearable Biometric System.
as waves pass through tissues and cells which predominantly contain water. If the sink is located
off-body, normal human body movements and posture when stationary would determine the quality
of information transmitted. This in-turn determines channel conditions and factors like latency
and throughput, which indirectly affect energy consumption [79].
2.2 System Model of WBS
The system model of WBS is shown in Figure 4 is a cyclical "continuous/online" process, where
wearables authenticate or identify users not on-demand but continuously. WBS comprise theWBAN
represented in Figure 3, the sink, and storage, which may or may not belong to the sink. WBAN is
bounded by constraints related to memory for storage and computation, network bandwidth for
communication, and energy consumption, among other key factors like interoperability, form factor
and bio-friendliness [42]. Some WBANs are also capable of doing minimal signal processing. Sink
can be functionally decomposed into a signal preprocessing unit, feature extraction and selection
unit, feature matching unit, and optionally a data storage and management unit. In some cases like
Fitbit or Google Glass, the sensor and sink nodes are integrated into one device, while the storage
and maintenance is pushed to cloud. Signal preprocessing involves operations such as smoothing,
interpolation, and normalization. Feature extraction and selection employ standard methods like
Principal or Independent Component Analysis (PCA/ICA), Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA),
logistic regression for minimal hardware complexity, and Short Time Fourier Transform (STFT)
for minimal memory and computation complexity [40, 163, 189]. Feature matching uses one-class
models for authentication and multi-class models for identification based on kNN, Support Vector
Machines (SVMs), Bayesian Networks and NaÃŕve Bayes, and Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs)
for supervised learning; and HiddenMarkov Models (HMMs) and Gaussian Mixture Models (GMMs)
for unsupervised learning. Sink-level storage lowers vulnerability to external threats, but limits
computational capabilities and increases form factor.
2.3 Products In the Market Using WBS
It was estimated that the market for WBS in sports and healthcare would reach at least 170
million devices by the end of 2017 [5]. WBS use both physical as well as behavioral modalities,
defined later in Section 3, where the former are more static and the latter more dynamic. The
behavioral modality-based systems employ hand-eye coordinations, user interactions, pressure,
tremors, and other finer movements in addition to the modality itself to capture the data needed
for authentication. This sophistication can be more easily achieved by WBS than TBS given their
mobility and proximity to the human body. Behavioral modalities have also been used in continuous
authentication, sometimes with randomized selection of features from a pool to base the analysis
ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. 9, No. 4, Article 39. Publication date: March 2017.
A Survey on Biometric Systems and Wearables 39:7
on. For example, EEG-based sensors, which measure stimulus-specific brainwaves to authenticate
users, have been of recent interest to the research community, and their application to WBS has
attracted decent attention. Below are a few other examples of emerging and recently available
products in the market that leverage WBS and mostly behavioral modalities:
(1) EEG: It is difficult with today’s technological advancement to consider EEG as one of the
unobtrusively measurable biometrics, since it needs the user to be stationary and calm,
and to wear a head-cap comprising electrodes. However, products developed by Muse and
Kokoon can be viewed as a productive step towards realizing EEG-based WBS in the future
• Muse has developed an application which measures EEG from the user’s temples to
which its sensors are attached [7]
• Kokoon provides a set of EEG headphones which measure user’s mental state or mood
using brainwaves emitted, and accordingly play music [169]
(2) ECG: It measures signals emitted by one’s heart that are unique to the individual and is
more applicable for WBS [187]. Unlike EEG, ECG can be unobtrusively measured using
just an electrode attached to the skin
• Bionym is a company that has developed the Nymi wristband to use heartbeat profiles
for uniquely identifying users and improving their lifestyle by personalizing their
living environment [1]
(3) Electromyogram (EMG): It being leveraged by sports clothing companies, Athos and
Myontech, to design sportswear more conducive for superior athletic performance [116]
• MyoWare has developed a hardware that facilitates the control of video games, robotic
movements, and actions of prosthetics based on movement profiles exhibited by the
user’s motor neurons [38]
(4) Vocal resonance: It refers to the voice of a user measured as the vocal sound waves
propagate through their body as against traditional voice recognition systems that use the
waves captured over air [60]. Placing contact microphones on the neck of the user, the
system can unobtrusively measure and model their vocal resonance
(5) TIAX LLC has designed and developed wearable sensors and algorithms which can derive
vital signs and bio-signatures
• To facilitate seamless coordination and communication with minimal user intervention,
the company has adopted sensor-fusion methods that combine different streams of
physiological data such as EEG and ECG, fingerprints, and EMG response
• The application of learning algorithms for discovering and exploiting unprecedented
patterns is also being conducted [95]
(6) In December 2016, Valencell and STMicroelectronics launched a Scalable Development
Kit (SDK) for biometric wearable and Internet of Things (IoT) sensor platform
• It uses SensorTile of the STMicroelectronics, an IoT sensor module with one STM32L4
microcontroller, a Bluetooth Low Energy chipset, a host of MEMS sensors including
accelerometer, magnetometer, pressure and temperature sensors that are both highly
accurate as well as energy-efficient, and a digital MEMS microscope [125]
• It is combined with Valencell’s Benchmark biometric sensor system platform, and
together enable the development and support of advanced wearable applications,
including biometric authentication and identification
• Valencell has also introduced technologies to measure heart-rate using forearm, and
earbud-based sensors for evaluating energy expenditure, net calories burned and
maximum oxygen consumption, and magnetic sensors for measuring cadence [74, 75,
120]
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(7) Skull Conduction: An integrated bone conduction speaker was designed and proposed
at the CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems in May, 2016, where
the authors introduced an embedded wearable, SkullConduct, integrated with wearable
computers like Google Glass [184]
• A 1-Nearest Neighbor (1NN) classifier was used in conjunction with Mel Frequency
Cepstral Coefficient (MFCC) features to analyze and interpret unique frequency re-
sponse registered by the skull in response to the propagation of soundwaves within
its bone structure
• It was touted to be stable, universal, collectible, non-invasive and robust. It was pro-
posed both as a verification as well as an identification system
(8) Signature: The work focused on using it as a form of identification, where an unknown
signature was used as an input to verify if a claimed identity was forged [156]
(9) Touch: This work leveraged touch-based behavioral modality and combined it with smart
eyewear to conduct continuous user authentication
• To reduce the invasiveness in authentication, the authors in this work proposed an
eyewear that captures user interactions such as single tap, forward, downward and
backward swipes, and backward two-finger swipes to perform continuous, online
authentication of the user [167]
• This has been touted to achieve a detection rate of 99% and a false alarm rate of 0.5%
under an equal probability of occurrence of all six perceived user events
All of the above applications more often than not consider the use of individual biometrics as
wearables, in which case certain significant challenges fail to come to the forefront. However, when
a colony of sensors are networked together to constitute a WBAN, security concerns become more
pronounced, as will be explored in Section 5.2.
Key Takeaway Points: The following are the key takeaway points from this section:
(1) WBAN is a central component of WBS and has a typical range of 1 to 2 meters around the
user’s body and comprises multiple sensors that can be implanted, embedded or invisible,
each dedicated to unobtrusively and independently measure specific modalities. Such
wearables are called passive biometric systems
(2) The nodes of WBAN use wireless protocols to communicate among themselves and are
coordinated by an on, in or off-body sink
(3) WBAN communication protocols must account for traffic resolution, collision contingencies,
energy-saving, auto-configuration, throughput and delay
(4) WBS system model comprises WBAN, and units for signal preprocessing, feature extraction
and selection, feature matching, and cloud-powered data storage and management
(5) There exist multiple WBS products in the market that utilize different modalities, either in
isolation or combination, such as EEG, EMG, vocal resonance, fingerprints, skull conduction,
signature, PPG, heart-rate, and touch
(6) Some of the forerunner companies that have released WBS products include Google, Fitbit,
Nymi, Myontech, Valencell, Apple, Motorola, Muse, Kokoon, TIAX LLC, and MyoWare
3 KEY CHARACTERISTICS OF WBS MODALITIES
Modalities can be categorized in various ways depending on the criteria. For instance, based on
their type, they can be classified as physiological (iris, hand, retina, fingerprint, DNA, earlobe,
Electrocardiogram (ECG) and odor among others), cognitive (Electroencephalogram [EEG]) and
behavioral (signature, keystroke, voice and gait among others) [28, 35]. All of these modalities
comprise certain characteristics like universal- should be possessed by every person, unique- should
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distinguish any two individuals, permanent- should not be drastically affected by age or fatigue,
collectible- should easily be acquired by non-invasive means, acceptable- should be approved by
the public for widespread use, and circumventive- should not allow adversaries to easily bypass it
[44, 61]. The modality characteristics for TBS was summarized in an earlier work [197].
Ideally, the modalities used by WBS, in addition to the above six characteristics for TBS, must
have the following characteristics: 1) Security: overall confidence that users can invest in the
modality against the loss of confidentiality, integrity or availability, 2) Reliability: extent to which
the modality can be trustworthy, 3) Mobility: extent to which the modality’s use does not get
impacted by constant or intermittent motion with respect to sink, 4) Variability: extent to which
the above characteristics change with respect to time, 5) Interference: extent to which the above
characteristics get adversely affected by the presence of physical or electromagnetic impediments,
and 6) Invasive: extent to which measurement of the modality creates user discomfort.
The constraints of WBANs like communication latency, throughput and amount of energy
consumed, in addition to security and resiliency, can be regarded as factors to determine the
characteristics. Table 1 summarizes the different WBS modality characteristics, where each fares
differently in satisfying the identified factors. The extent to which each modality contributes to
enhance favorable factors (like throughput, goodput, security, resiliency) and reduce unfavorable
factors (like energy consumed, latency, size) is used to qualitatively rank their suitability to a
particular characteristic: H stands for High suitability,M for Medium and L for Low. As explained
earlier in Section 1, the modalities, irrespective of being applied to TBS or WBS, must be unique,
universal, permanent, collectible, acceptable and circumventive in nature.
The Table shows how the modalities shown in Figure 2 fare with the key characteristics identified
for WBS. It can be inferred that while some modalities fare poorer for certain characteristics
when implemented in TBS, they fare better on WBS. For example, iris or retinal pattern might be
cumbersome to measure when implemented in TBS since the users are required to place their eye
in line and close to the camera. However, the same when implemented in WBS is very easy to
measure, considering users can use smart eye-wear like Google Glass to efficiently measure iris
structures and even retinal patterns in a less invasive manner.
Key Takeaway Points: The following are the key takeaway points from this section:
(1) Biometric modalities must have six fundamental characteristics. They should be universal,
permanent, collectible, unique, acceptable, and circumventive
(2) The modalities used by WBS have additional characteristics: security, reliability, mobility,
variability, interference and invasiveness
(3) The constraints of WBANs like communication latency, throughput/goodput, and amount
of energy consumed, can be regarded as primary factors that determine the system’s
operational dynamics
(4) While some modalities fare poorer for certain characteristics when implemented in TBS,
they fare better on WBS as they could be easier to measure
(5) Modalities that have a "Low" suitability for a particular characteristic in TBS domain might
possess a "High" suitability for the same characteristic in WBS domain, considering the
two systems have different operational dynamics
(6) It can, hence, be understood that the operational dynamics identified in point number (3)
significantly shape the extent to which the modalities contribute favorably to their different
characteristics, thereby showcasing a strong dependency between the two
(7) Between physiological and behavioral modalities, further explained in Section 3, the latter
havemore dynamism, and hence are better suited for continuous authentication applications
that would also not increase the invasiveness or jeopardize the privacy of users
ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. 9, No. 4, Article 39. Publication date: March 2017.
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4 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION METRICS FOR TBS ANDWBS
Although modalities typically satisfy most characteristics described in Section 2.3, they focus on
the modality itself but not on the products that use the modality. Performance is more applicable
for products that use biometrics rather than the biometric itself. The characteristics summarized in
Table 1 also affect the performance of such technologies. With the integration of high-end data
fusion, analytics, processing, and personalization in order to securely authenticate and/or identify
users, performance can be considered an important part of evaluating biometric systems.
4.1 Performance Evaluation Metrics for TBS
Evaluating the performance of TBS has been a widely studied topic in literature [8, 70, 85, 89]. A
comprehensive summary of different performance evaluation metrics and charts used for TBS was
described and summarized in [168]. The work documents that in accordance with the ISO/IEC
standard 19795 Parts 1 and 2 for biometric system performance evaluation, multiple metrics are
used for verification, such as:
• False Match Rate (FMR): probability of the technology wrongly authenticating an individual
claiming to belong to his correct identity
• False Non-Match Rate (FNMR): probability of the system wrongly rejecting an individual
claiming to belong to his correct identity
• EER or Crossover Error Rate (CER): probability that FMR = FNMR or False Accept Rate
(FAR) = False Reject Rate (FRR), where FAR and FRR are system-level errors
• True Acceptance Rate (TAR) which is 1−FRR; andWeighted Error Rate (WER): the weighted
sum of FMR and FNMR [209]
Several curves have also been proposed in order to measure system performance more compre-
hensively, such as:
• Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) which plots FNMR, FRR or TAR on Y-axis and
FMR or FAR in X-axis
• Detection Error Trade-off (DET ) curve which uses nonlinearly scaled axes to show the
regions of error rates of interest
• Expected Performance Curve (EPC) which uses a performance criterion like FMR to mea-
sure performance in terms of FNMR or vice-versa
The first two curves are a posteriori as the evaluation is dependent on previous knowledge, and
the last is a priori since it is independent of prior knowledge. A more comprehensive study
was incorporated in [78], where TBS performance evaluation was restructured considering the
international Common Criteria (CC) for Information Technology (IT) Security Evaluation and its
Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM) guidelines, viewing TBS as IT systems.
This paper classifies TBS into Verification and Identification systems, the latter focused on deter-
mining the identity of an individual who may belong to the database (closed-set) or not (open-set).
Closed-set system performance evaluation is done using a Cumulative Match Characteristic
(CMC) curve proposed in [65], mostly used for systems which generate an ordered list of matches
between the test subject and existing samples in the database, sorted from most likely to the least.
Each of these matches are labeled as a rank. The first match, which is most likely, is called Rank-1,
followed by the second most likely match labeled as Rank-2, and so on. CMC plots probability value
on the Y-axis against rank on the X-axis. The probability value for a given rank k , known as "identi-
fication rate for rank k", depicts the percentage of time when the system correctly identifies the test
individual within the first k ranks. Ideally, the system is expected to identify an individual in the
first attempt (first rank). Hence, Rank-1 CMC is ideal. However, in real-world conditions, systems
tend to have identification rates closer to 1 as the ranks increase. As a measure of performance, the
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system whose identification rate hits 1 for the least rank value is deemed to be better. This metric is
more widely used for face and iris recognition systems.Open-set identification is done using two
approaches: exhaustive comparison where the system compares the test sample with all existing
samples in the database, and retrieval-based systems where it employs two subsystems for filtering
the samples to allow only those with a "score" above the predefined threshold to be considered for
the matching process, and the actual matching with test sample. This class of methods consider
two more metrics: Detection and Identification Rate (DIR), and False Alarm Rate.
4.2 Performance Evaluation Metrics for WBS
The performance ofWBS under real-world conditions is more complex to measure owing to multiple
external factors which vary with the type of modality, such as ambient noise, distractions, poor
connectivity between the sensors and sink, lighting conditions, stress, and anxiety. Hence, most
research efforts attempt to quantify their performance under laboratory or experimental conditions,
making it idealistic.
Nevertheless, performance evaluation of WBS is very nascent. Metrics identified for TBS such as
accuracy, FAR, FRR, ERR, and DIR are also applicable for WBS. However, the term "accuracy" has
gained a deeper significance among others in wearable context, where it includes not just accuracy
in the measurement of the signals, but also the confidence-level, immunity against external and
bodily disturbances, quality of operation among sensors, communication latency and throughput,
quality of assurance of results, efficient WBAN management to avoid congestion and collision, and
energy consumption rate [6, 13]. In a preliminary survey conducted at the Biometrics Institute
Asia Pacific Conference in May, 2016, fifty-four professionals were asked to provide their inputs on
the potential applications for WBS, some crucial concerns they saw as hindrances to widespread
adoption of the technology, and some potential formats in which they could be made available in
the future [12]. This paper utilizes the results from the study to propose more metrics with respect
to the components identified in the WBS system model earlier.
In literature, much emphasis has been laid on form factor and size as contributing factors towards
achieving optimal or near-optimal performance, considering that the performance of WBS decrease
with decreasing form factor. While reduced form-factor could sometimes imply greater comfort for
the users, it limits local computation capability, necessitating the use of signal processing, feature
extraction and matching to be located external to WBAN. This in-turn exposes the WBS to threats
that TBS did not have to deal with. Before reviewing the evaluation metrics, the factors on which
wearable performance depend are described below in brief.
(1) Physiology: Modalities are sensitive at different levels to different factors such as skin
complexion, body shape and size. For example, the level of fat under the skin could affect
the measurement of EMG signals, but it might not affect the measurement of a signal like
EEG. Similarly, skin complexion could change the level of absorbed light (used by PPG)
(2) Number and placement of sensors directly correlates with the quality of signal mea-
surement. Improper placement or implantation of sensors leads to weak or erroneous
measurement, affecting quality and accuracy, and hence performance
(3) Changes induced by mobility: Quality of operation must not vary beyond an acceptable
range when users are subject to movement, including rigorous physical exercise, true
especially for ECG, PPG and EEG that are prone to interference with external noise
(4) Environmental elements: External noise due to ambient elements could significantly
corrupt the measured signals. A technique called Active Signal Characterization (ASC),
proposed by Valencell, measures biological, motion, and environmental signals as they
come through optical and accelerometer sensors [119]. The required signal is then filtered
to remove noise related to motion and other external signals. The separated noise could
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be used as supplementary data to deliver crucial insights into the user environment and
motion-related features. A preliminary study has also been conducted on PPG [14]
(5) Crossovers: Periodic movements made by a body could be mistaken by the system to
represent a biometric modality. For example, the step-rate measured during activities like
jogging or running could be mistaken for heart-rate and lead to miscalculations or wrongful
verification/identification, both which bring down performance
(6) Performance of the matching classifiers: Whether one-class or multi-class, feature
matching algorithms have their pros and cons with respect to performance. No matter
how good a signal measurement, a less accurate classifier with poorly fit model could
yield substandard results. The classifier model’s performance for skewed training data
(classification bias), precision, recall, and F1-score are some additional performance metrics
that could be used to indirectly measure WBS performance [147]
(7) Handling heterogeneity: There are multiple types of wearable sensors that comprise
WBAN, but measurement, signal preprocessing, feature extraction, selection and matching
techniques for each of them vary significantly. Hence, the features that extractor and
selector models look for also vary. However, in a comprehensive wearable environment,
the extractor/selector and matcher are all embedded within a single device. Hence, the
models used for performing such tasks must be adaptive to more than one type of signal,
and the changing tolerance levels to different signals affects performance
Based on these factors, many performance evaluation metrics have been proposed recently in
literature, including some patents [32, 34, 121, 182]. They have all been investigated for healthcare
and personal fitness, specifically for PPG. It is noteworthy that, like characteristics, metrics for TBS
performance evaluation are also applicable for WBS. Following are the metrics unique to WBS.
• Accuracy:Affected by factors 1-7; its calculation could be subjective due to the involvement
of many subject-variant factors. Companies such as Valencell have attempted to deliver
Precision Wearable Biometrics that account for these factors. Much emphasis has been laid
on wearables for healthcare and fitness applications, but not user security
• Flexibility: Affected by factors 1, 2, 7; considering the dynamic and highly sensitive nature
of WBS, much performance analysis has been typically done through validation testing
by classes of users representing different physiologies such as skin tone, complexion and
texture, body shape and size, and much more [115]. It has become a common practice
employed by most wearable companies prior to releasing products. In other words, the
WBS should be flexible enough to be used by majority of the human population
• Interoperability: Affected by factors 3, 4, 7; WBS must actively communicate either with
other wearables within the same WBAN or to the sink(s). They must not only measure
data with good quality, but also transmit them to the sink without losses or corruption.
WBAN communication strategies discussed earlier in Section 2.1 provide an insight into
the interoperability of WBS
• Security: Affected by factors 2, 4, 5; besides lossless and reliable communication, security
is also key to performance. Encryption might not be suitable to secure signals from wear-
able sensors as it demands additional computation power. Efficient resource-aware key
management and signal data scrambling methods are two alternatives, where descrambling
could be performed by the sink during signal preprocessing
• Resource allocation: Affected by 2, 4, 5; prolonged battery life is one of the highly an-
ticipated deliverables for WBS. Hence, the extent to which WBAN nodes manage their
computation and communication powers to maximize functioning while minimizing con-
sumption could be a metric for evaluating performance
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• Versatility: Affected by factors 1-3, 7; it is the extent to which a WBS can be effectively
molded into different consumer-friendly forms that encourage longer battery life and
reduced form factor. People are fashion-conscious, and hence, WBS must not only be
non-invasive and comfortable, but also be elegantly designed with appealing aesthetics in
such a way that performance is not hindered
• Power Consumption: Affected by factors 2, 4-7; in order to optimize power consumption,
the amount of energy expended by sensors for every bit of information could determine their
performance [94]. Furthermore, as shown by [51] for Bluetooth-WBAN, synchronization
strategies could help improve accuracy and limit unnecessary power consumption, thereby
improving overall performance.Wake-up Radios (WURs) were proposed to listen to wireless
channels in a power-efficient way through preamble sampling and continuous channel
listening [145]
• Network Efficiency: Affected by factors 2, 4, 5; optimal use of communication bandwidth
is a key concern for nodes within WBAN, between WBAN nodes and sink or, in some cases,
between sink and cloud. Since most wearables today use wireless communication like WiFi,
Bluetooth and cellular networks, they operate in the same frequency bands as other devices
like mobile phones, laptops, and smart home appliances. While temporary solutions such
as freeing up more bandwidth, spectrum sharing, and dynamic allocation and deallocation
of bandwidth depending on the usage have been implemented, underlying bottlenecks
of network congestion, noise, and subsequently performance degradation persist. Visi-
ble spectrum was proposed to establish wireless information transfer via Light Emitting
Diodes (LEDs) [39]. Multi-tiered network architecture was also proposed, bolstering the
emerging fifth generation (5G) mobile-communication systems where there exists one
device, known as "seed", that connects to the internet and relays common information to
the nodes subscribed to it [97]. Dynamic use of bandwidth can be feasible through the
use of Cognitive Radios, which hop into underutilized bandwidths, lowering latency and
maximizing performance [92]
• Spectral Efficiency: Affected by factors 2, 4, 5; measured in bits/s/Hz, it refers to the
extent to which a physical or MAC layer protocol can effectively use the limited frequency
spectrum bandwidth available (Hz) to maximize its information rate (bits/s). For WBS,
this is very important given their limited resources and bandwidth. Spectral efficiency
η has a probable mathematical formulation as shown below, where NR and NT are the
number of receivers (sink) and transmitters (sensors) respectively; Gi j is the goodput
(transmission of useful information bits between transmitter i and receiver j per unit time);
Di j is distance between transmitter i and receiver j;Ui j is mean societal value received by
transmitter i from receiver j in return for every bit transmitted, where the societal value
includes economic, social and environmental benefits; and A and B are area and bandwidth,
respectively, in which transmitter i and receiver j operate [196]:
η =
NR∑
j=1
NT∑
i=1
Gi jDi jUi j
AB
(1)
Key Takeaway Points: The following are the key takeaway points from this section:
(1) TBS performance has been conventionally measured using metrics like FAR, FRR, FMR,
FNMR, EER/CER, TAR, ROC, DET, EPC
(2) Although the metrics used to evaluate TBS can be extended to evaluate WBS, the latter
have more metrics owing to their differing operational dynamics
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(3) Some of the key metrics that can be used to evaluate the performance of WBS include
system accuracy, operation flexibility, device and application-level interoperability, systemic
security, functional versatility, resource-efficiency, energy-efficiency, network efficiency,
and spectral efficiency
(4) WBS performance measured by each of the above metrics is in-turn impacted by one or
more of various factors such as physiology, placement and orientation of sensors, external
environment, crossovers, system component performance, and heterogeneity in sensing
and computation
5 THREATS, ATTACKS AND DEFENSES FOR TBS ANDWBS
Before moving ahead, a primer on the terms related to biometric security is briefly presented. A
Threat is anything that has the potential to inflict serious harm to the technology of concern. A
vulnerability is a weakness that when successfully exploited manifests the threat into an attack [18].
An attack vector is a means by which a malicious entity can compromise a system by exploiting
its vulnerabilities for a malicious outcome [183]. An attack is the execution of an attack vector
by an adversary who successfully exploits a series of vulnerabilities in the concerned domain. A
coordinated attack comprises multiple attacks, sequential or parallel, represented using attack
vectors that may exploit the same vulnerabilities. An attack is applicable to both TBS as well as WBS
in two ways: system attacks that tamper the hardware or firmware, or pattern recognition attacks
where the feature extraction and feature matching modules are harmed. While system attacks are
applicable to any domain, pattern recognition attacks target feature selection and extraction. It
can be said that TBS and WBS are both prone to system attacks, but it is harder to conduct pattern
recognition attacks on WBS. However, it is not impossible to do so, as will be discussed in Section 4.
The threats, attacks, and defense landscapes can be categorized for the purposes of this survey into
different classes. The first, called Technology Attack (T ), considers attacks that exploit vulnerabilities
of the system’s technology, while the second, called Modality Attack (M), considers attacks that
exploit vulnerabilities of biometric modalities used by the technology. When an adversary exploits
vulnerabilities of both technology as well as modalities, a Hybrid Attack (H ) could be realized. These
attacks can be applied to both TBS as well as WBS.There are also different Agents which enforce a
threat into an attack: impostor that deliberately or accidentally pretends to be the authorized entity,
attacker that intends to access or compromise the technology with malicious intent, snooper that
intends to access or compromise the technology with no malice, and erroneous that compromises
the technology accidentally. Sometimes, these agents could also be non-human [18]. Penetration
testing is conducted to discover hidden vulnerabilities and establish attack vectors that can then be
mitigated [41].
5.1 Threats, Attacks and Defenses for TBS
Figure 5 shows the systemmodel of TBS with different points of attacks, as identified by the different
works in literature [21, 66, 153, 166]. In this figure, only the authentication phase of the system is
shown, since enrollment is subsumed in the authentication except for the template creation stage,
the security-related significance of which was already described in Section 1. Considering how
various components interact with each other, a successful attack on one component could pave
way for subsequent compromise of other components. It is to be understood that the categorization
of attacks described earlier in this section is made with a certain degree of independence between
them. For example, a successful Modality attack does not guarantee a successful compromise of the
entire system, since the technology might still remain unaffected. Similarly, a Technology attack
might be conducted without directly compromising any of the modalities. Those attacks which
require to disrupt both technology as well as modality are categorized as Hybrid to avoid any
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Fig. 5. Block diagram of attack model for TBS.
confusion. While a successful Modality attack affects confidentiality but not necessarily integrity
and availability, a successful Technology attack impacts integrity and availability but not necessarily
confidentiality. A Hybrid attack compromises all three cornerstones of security.
Table 3 summarizes the attacks, corresponding threats and defenses against them. Analysis of
system-specific attacks and defenses have been extensively studied in literature [71, 193].
Table 2. Summary of class-wise TBS threats, attacks and defense mechanisms
Class Attacks Threats, Vulnerabilities Defenses
M
[48, 52, 73, 82,
83, 86, 88, 100,
101, 105, 172,
173, 191, 217]
Presentation attack,
Collusion,
Coercion
Easily reproducible,
Poor manual supervision,
Poor fault tolerance,
Gullible to close relatives,
Residuals
Supervised enrollment,
PAD,
Access controls
Sys
[2, 19, 54, 68,
76, 103, 104,
110, 111, 148,
164, 176, 204–
206]
Physical tamper,
Replay,
Man-in-the-Middle,
Bad data injection,
Template substitute,
Template
compromise,
Denial of Service
Lack of policy enforcements,
Sensor memory/ circuit
limits,
Flaw in sensor software,
Poor key management,
Weak/no encryption,
Vulnerable communication,
No perfect forward secrecy,
Lack of interoperability
between other systems,
Susceptibility to Trojan
horse,
Trade-off between template
security and system
performance,
Storage channel
interception,
Key discovery
Firewalls,
Physical security,
Fall-back systems for
fault tolerance,
Use of Session keys and
timestamps,
Digital signatures,
Random/ cued
challenges,
Multi-factor
authentication,
Biometric
cryptosystems,
Template encryption,
Template fusion,
One-time biometrics
continued . . .
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. . . continued
Class Attacks Threats, Vulnerabilities Defenses
PR
[20, 22, 36, 62,
107, 117, 132,
141, 154, 162,
174, 186, 198,
202, 216, 219]
Characterize feature
extractor,
Feature replay,
Feature correlation,
Trojan horse to alter
match scores
Known template storage
format,
Information of data type
created by feature extractor,
Correlation among features,
Matcher and
decision-maker program
error,
Poor exception handling,
Missing match upper
bounds
Use biometric feature
entropy,
Revocable biometrics,
Feature randomization
from multiple input sets,
Effective debugging
with exhaustive use-case
testing,
Match-score
quantization
H
[26, 84, 87, 90,
93, 139, 147,
158, 215]
Buffer Overflow,
Enrolling crafted
samples to matcher,
Hill climbing
Fraud during enrollment Feature fusion from
multiple modalities
5.1.1 M Threats, Attacks and Defenses. This class refers to attacks that exploit the vulnerabilities
of the users or their modalities to successfully penetrate into the system. Spoofing or identity (ID)
theft is the oldest form of attack (also called a Direct or Presentation Attack) where modalities such
as fingerprints, iris, signature and others can be recreated or spoofed using gummy fingers, high
resolution color printouts, 3D robotic eyes, and much more [52, 73, 100, 105]. In general, to protect
against Class 1 attacks, proper enforcement of enterprise-level security such as access controls must
be enabled. Additionally, security policies must be strictly enforced to avoid creating loopholes.
Physical hardware of TBS must be capable of working without significant loss of performance
in the event of an attack or outage [217]. Targeted direct attacks have lately been minimized by
the use of sophisticated sensors equipped with Presentation Attack Detection - PAD (also called
live-ness or vitality detection, or anti-spoofing) techniques [48, 82, 83, 86, 88, 101, 172, 173, 191].
5.1.2 Sys Threats, Attacks and Defenses. This class of attacks target the system components
by exploiting vulnerabilities at different points identified in the system model (Figure 1) except
the feature extractor and matcher: communication channels, modality residuals, and the template
storage unit. Two forms of eavesdropping attacks exist. Passive eavesdropping intercepts the
vulnerable communication channel between sensor and feature extractor modules but does not alter
or steal it; active eavesdropping like Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) and storage channel interception
usurp, swap, or corrupt legitimate data to disrupt rightful operation of the system [2]. While only a
few employ encryption when sending the captured biometric signals, they do not enforce forward
secrecy (a method to ensure the non-compromise of previously secure events even if the current
event is compromised) [164]. Attacks and defenses related to biometric templates discussed in
Section 1 are applicable here. Since TBS are database-oriented, they need to query the stored
template in order to make the comparison, which an attacker could modify. If the encryption is not
strong, the attacker can replace the query with malware to corrupt the database [76]. Template
swapping is a special case of substitution. It deals with replacing a legitimate template with that of
any user, even external to the system [104, 110]. Alternatively, template could be compromised by
exploiting weaknesses in the database architecture or schema, enabling the attacker to insert, update
or delete templates of legitimate users. DoS can be executed by feeding TBS with an overwhelming
number of feature samples through Bad Data Injection (BDI), MITM, or replay [204].
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Specific defense mechanisms such as tagging input signals with timestamps and using session
keys to ensure forward secrecy have been developed [176]. Template encryption, where secure
sketch schemes, homomorphic encryption, and chaotic theory, could be used, considering standard
hashing and encryption methods which are applicable for other types of data fail for biometric
templates [68, 148]. A modified Hill Cipher algorithm for encryption and a combinatorial Discrete
Cosine and Discrete Wavelet Transforms for concealment were proposed that led to an overall
improvement in template storage [111]. Templates could be alternatively stored separately on
smart cards, backed by biometric cryptosystems. However, this imposes an additional restriction
of users having to carry cards all the time and increases the overall system complexity. One-time
biometrics deter storage channel interception by using statistical learning to create biometric
representations, and then applies chaotic mixing to generate an encrypted template, constituting a
self-generated, dynamic helper data [19]. Encrypted template is then decrypted into constituent
biometric representations using well-trained Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) and iterative Blind
Source Separation before being fed into fuzzy matcher. A multi-factor authentication can also
provide defense against MITM attacks by combining modality samples with PINs or passwords
[103]. However, such additional authentication mechanisms could prove counterproductive to the
reason biometrics were introduced. Biometric cryptosystems, which generate a helper data using a
secret key and biometric features, may also be used to prevent MITM attacks [206]. Here, only the
helper data, which by itself is useless to an attacker, is stored by the system, while the secret key is
reconstructed during authentication using extracted features and helper data [54, 205].
5.1.3 PR Threats, Attacks and Defenses. Attacks on feature extractor andmatcher can be regarded
mostly as PR in nature. Since randomness in modality features is hard to achieve for cryptosystems,
fuzzy-based extractors using shielding functions, fuzzy commitment, and fuzzy vault schemes
were proposed and applied to the key binding process [107, 117]. However, attacks using feature
correlation are shown to significantly reduce performance [219]. If the attacker has prior knowledge
about the feature extractor, optimization methods to estimate the unknowns can be devised using
the knowns, exploiting statistical dependencies. Further, knowledge of feature extracting algorithms
such as PCA and LDAwhich use the entire biometric sample to construct feature vectors, and Gabor
filters and HMMs which select specific features of modalities prior to forming the feature vector,
can be used to exploit the correlation between features of modalities that the extractors also use
[20]. False Data Injection (FDI) could corrupt extracted features by the addition of random noise or
intelligent data. Such attacks could either be aimed at feeding a large number of erroneous feature
vectors to the matcher that would increase its FRR beyond acceptable limits, or at manipulating the
vector to circumvent or bypass the matcher.
Probable defense mechanisms include measuring feature entropy to gauge the level of uniqueness
of the modality and also the strength of cryptosystems for guaranteeing privacy [132]. Cancelable
or Revocable biometrics, also referred to as template transformation, distort input features by
a specific function by applying Gaussian noise models, and use multiple distorted features for
different levels of authentication [154, 174]. They store not the original features but only the
distorted ones. However, they have a potential of increasing the system’s FRR considering the
inherent feature variability among modalities. Feature extractors take this into account using error
correction codes, adjustable filters, correlation, or quantization [141, 198, 202, 216]. Alternatively,
randomization of biometrics could be used, where multiple samples of a biometric signal is taken
(the number of samples varies), and a cumulative average of the samples is used to minimize the
intra-class variance [36]. Multimodal feature fusion is also proposed, which differs from revocable
biometrics by applying transformations and distortions to a single modality feature set to produce
multiple feature vectors. Feature fusion has been successfully applied to feature extractors and
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tested for its robustness against various attacks including spoofing and replay of extracted features,
and potentially feature correlation attacks [22, 62, 162, 186]. However, practical significance of
multi-factor authentication, revocable biometrics and biometric cryptosystems is limited.
5.1.4 H Threats, Attacks and Defenses. Attacks that are a hybrid ofM and Sys: buffer overflow
and residuals. Buffer overflow involves a system interacting with an external environment seeking
inputs, in this case, the sensor(s) [26]. Flaws in sensor memory allocation protocols could be
exploited by such an attack to overwrite codes important for system’s rightful operation. System
authentication could be bypassed in some cases. Further, residuals (latent fingerprints, signature
imprints, or pressure points on specific keys in keystroke recognition systems) can be exploited to
conduct replay attacks [87]. A Hill Climbing (HC) attack is a hybrid ofM , Sys and PR attacks, made
more powerful by Nelder-Mead simplex optimization [158]. It creates an application that sends
random templates to the system, disturbed iteratively [84, 147]. The systemworks by reading output
match score and proceeding with perturbed template only after score surpasses the acceptance
threshold. Successful applications of HCA to TBS exist in literature [84, 139].
Since HCA targets matching scores of feature matching algorithms, defense mechanisms aim to
immunize the matcher. Score-level fusion techniques namely, SVMs, likelihood ratio-based fusion,
and sum rule-based method preceded by normalization, were analyzed for their performance and
accuracy for multimodal biometric systems comprising fingerprints, face and finger vein [93].
Another contemporary method proposed the use of triangular norms to make score-level fusion
faster and computationally efficient, again for multimodal systems [90]. HCA was applied for online
signature TBS by modifying initialization, restart and centroid computation steps of traditional
Nelder-Mead algorithm. It also proposed a Llyod-Max non-uniform score quantizer to determine
quantization levels such that the Mean Square Error (MSE) between original and quantized versions
is minimized. Additionally, decision-level template fusion was shown to degrade performance
least when compared to fusion at sample, instance, or algorithmic levels [215]. Since matching
and decision-making modules of the system contain program codes that have access to crucial
parameters besides the match score, like FRR, FAR, FNMR, and EER, ineffective program blocks
could be compromised through the use of Trojan horse.
5.2 Threats, Attacks and Defenses for WBS
WBS are associated with a new dimension of threats and vulnerabilities. Figure 6 shows their generic
attack model. In WBS domain, ClassM attacks exploit vulnerabilities of modalities and users, while
Sys attacks are surveyed under two classes: Sys-WBAN and Sys-Sink . Attacks on WBAN sensors,
intra-body communication, and the communication channel between WBAN and sink come under
Fig. 6. Block diagram of attack model for WBS.
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Sys-WBAN while those that target the sink’s signal preprocessing unit, communication between
sink and cloud, and cloud storage infrastructure itself. Class PR attacks target the sink’s feature
extraction and selection, and feature matching. Table 3 summarizes threats and vulnerabilities,
attacks and corresponding defenses for WBS, organized class-wise.
Table 3. Summary of class-wise WBS threats, attacks and defense mechanisms
Class Attacks Threats, Vulnerabilities Defenses
M [37, 50] Motion-based
keystroke inference,
Collusion,
Coercion
Poor manual supervision,
Poor fault tolerance,
Gullible to close relatives,
Residuals
Supervised enrollment,
PAD,
Access controls
Sys-
WBAN
[27, 46, 49,
109, 142,
160, 161,
185, 208,
208, 214,
220]
Direct attacks,
MITM,
(D)DoS,
Counterfeit sensors,
Selective forwarding,
Jamming,
Brute-force search,
Sybil/Wormhole
Sensors transmit only useful
information,
Difficult policy-making,
Expensive to encrypt,
Feature entropy,
WBAN broadcasting,
Noisy network,
Half-duplex intra-WBAN
communication
Multi-point fuzzy
commitment,
Cluster-based security,
MBStar WBAN topology,
Trust-based key
management,
Elliptic Curve,
Cryptography
Additional hardware filters,
Defensive jamming,
Hyper-quiet networks,
Tamper-proof sensors,
BCC
Sys-Sink
[11, 33, 56,
69, 98, 99,
112, 114,
124, 127,
128, 133,
140, 143,
144, 146,
155, 157,
170, 171,
190, 210,
211, 218]
Sniffing,
Data misuse by third
party,
Threats due to third
party,
Providing false trust
credentials,
SQL injection,
CSRF,
Traffic redirection,
Malware,
Privacy exposure,
Session hijack,
BDI,
JTAG (-R),
External device
mis-bonding,
Side-channel attack
Weak/no WBAN-to-sink
authentication,
Varied off-body sink
network dynamics,
Third party encryption,
More data logged than
revealed,
Application of similar
security levels for different
kinds of data,
Sink broadcasts to cloud,
TLS could be bypassed,
Location-related
information storage,
Obtrusive authentication,
Untrusted applications
installed,
Vulnerabilities of sink,
Weak device-application
bonding policies
Cluster-based security,
Proximity detection,
Mutual authentication,
Random challenge/
response,
Network segmentation,
Administration of backups,
Dedicated onsite cloud,
Careful policy inspection,
Data protection,
Context-based data security,
Trust revocation,
HTTPS with SSL,
Network segmentation,
Data compartmentalization,
Symmetric encryption,
Timestamps to obfuscate
patterns,
OS-level device-application
bonding
continued . . .
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. . . continued
Class Attacks Threats, Vulnerabilities Defenses
PR [58,
106, 207]
Cryptanalytic
attacks
Noise/ redundancy in
signals,
Collection of geolocation
and time-synchronized
information,
Time-variance of signals
Matching-level fusion,
Multi-factor authentication,
Feature-level fusion,
Attribute-based encryption,
Case-based reasoning,
Spectral analysis of signals
5.2.1 M Threats, Attacks and Defenses. At the modality-level, WBS exhibit slight variations in
attack surface than TBS. While direct attacks are possible in WBS too, they are not conducted using
shoulder-surfing or spoofing of templates, since WBS employ passive authentication. Hence, such
attacks are conducted at the system level (Class Sys-WBAN ). Collusion and coercion, however,
are still prevalent techniques that employ social engineering skills to deceive a legitimate WBS
into authenticating or identifying an attacker. Amotion-based keystroke inference attack on
smartphones was demonstrated by [50], where its feasibility was shown despite the influence of
noise, device dimensions and screen orientation. Using Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) deep
neural networks, motion sensors of wearable wristbands like smartwatches could be used to infer
keys typed by the owner on other devices like PC or cellphone keypad for spying [37].
5.2.2 Sys-WBAN Threats, Attacks and Defenses. This class of attacks target WBAN and the
communication between WBAN and sink. Owing to stringent energy and resource limits, WBAN
sensors transmit only useful information, and go through sleep and wakeup cycles to conserve
energy, relaying messages through half-duplex wireless broadcasts. By virtue of this, direct attacks
by eavesdropping are prevalent. Thorough network reconnaissance could make an external wireless
node privy to signals being exchanged between sensors, and sometimes even between sensors and
sink. Decoded signals could reveal sensitive information that could then be stolen by the adversary,
or even modified to make sensors act anomalously, causing life-threatening behaviors. Sometimes,
counterfeited sensors could be deployed into WBAN which are prone to jamming attack where
a malicious node reduces availability by causing collision to each packet of interest [208], Sybil
attack where a sensor node exhibits dynamic personality by falsely claiming the identities of other
surrounding nodes within the same WBAN through impersonation [160], or wormhole attack
where a sensor node could trick other nodes in the network into thinking it is only a few hops away
from them when in reality it could be otherwise, thereby not only confusing the routing algorithms,
but also causing more energy and resource consumption [109]. Counterfeited or compromised
sensors could also be manipulated to conduct selective forwarding attacks, where the node
intercepts only specific packets of data but not all, thus prompting re-transfer or restart of packets
that in-turn drains energy [49]. Most WBS use Bluetooth, WiFi, and ZigBee for communicating
with their sinks [33]. For higher performance and comfort, most commercial WBS transfer sensitive
geolocation in clear text, which could be easily intercepted through brute-force attacks. Most
WBAN-sink communications only employ sink-to-WBAN authentication to minimize the overhead
on WBAN. However, this makes the entire communication link vulnerable toMITM and salami
thefts, the latter of which steals small chunks of sensitive data unrecognizable individually but
compromises over time. No work in literature has studied the effect of salami attack on WBS, but
an assessment of salami attacks and ID thefts on IoT, a superset of WBS, was conducted by [99].
Amulti-point Fuzzy commitment scheme for key management using ECGwas proposed, and
its performance evaluated by augmenting Gray coding into its binary encoder and error correcting
codes to fine-tune accuracy [46]. A unique data scrambling approach using interpolation and
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random sampling was also applied instead of conventional symmetric cryptographic techniques.
However, the practicality of this strategy in the presence of fading and distortions was only briefly
addressed. Another energy-efficient key management and refresh scheme usingmultiple clusters
was proposed, which used both predetermined as well randomly generated ECG keys for creating
hybrid security [27]. This technique is applicable better to WBANs than data scrambling. A more
reliable and secure protocol for the inherent star topology of WBANs was proposed, termed as
MBStar [220], addressing the problem of long hyper-period communications required by TDMA
in the MAC layer under varying schedule profiles by keeping a global hyper-period schedule on the
gateway/sink side and assign node-specific local schedules with conflict resolution. It demonstrated
co-existence functionalities with other standard protocols like Bluetooth, ZigBee and WiFi. A
trust key management scheme for WBAN implemented using ECG utilizes ECG to generate
symmetric session keys and manage them for end-to-end communication, also between sensors and
sink [142]. Some approaches advocate the separation of signal measurement and authentication
in sensors, where a separate middle-entity called Guardian was proposed for the Implantable
Medical Devices (IMDs) scenario to protect against jamming, direct attacks, selective forwarding,
and brute-force search through techniques like defensive jamming (jamming sensors when
communication link is jammed by an attacker) [214]. Some defense methods consider non-Radio
Frequency (RF) wireless data communication using Body Channel Communications (BCCs),
where the human body is converted into a channel/medium to sendmessages, consuming power less
than 1mW at rates greater than 100kbps [161, 185].Hyper-quiet network principles and network
segmentation employ layered architecture for isolating network traffic based on the type of data
to be transmitted, thereby lowering network congestion. Although encryption is the most sought
solution in networks, it is an expensive feature for WBAN-sink communications, especially with
WBAN. Traditional Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) use RSA, but other methods such as Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (ECC) in conjunction with symmetric encryption have been proposed [127].
In some cases, proximity detection can be used where the distance between WBAN and sink can
ascertain whether the signal is fraudulent. However, simple proximity checking might not work in
cases where wearables are designed to perform remote services. Hence, context-aware proximity
checking is needed.Mutual authentication could also be used where wearable sensors and sink
establish handshake to ensure secure communication channels using Physical Unclonable Function
(PUF) that employs challenge-response methods to parry replay attacks [128], and an energy-aware
mutual authentication by the use of hash and XOR operations over a star two-tiered topology [98].
5.2.3 Sys-Sink Threats, Attacks, and Defenses. This class targets the sink’s signal processing
and computation units, cloud, and communication link between sink and cloud. While some WBS
feature local storage and processing capabilities, still many others like Google Glass and Fitbit opt for
cloud-based data storage and processing. Although loss of privacy and network impersonation
attacks could be conducted when sink communicates with cloud, traffic redirection and Cross-
Site Request Forgery (CSRF) attacks are also emergent [218]. A greater number of organizations
adopt Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) policies, where multiple sinks can access similar services
offered by the cloud [112]. Multiple applications within a sink can also establish communication
with the cloud, creating an environment vulnerable to sniffing or theft of legitimate information.
WBS could use Software as a Service (SaaS) cloud platforms, which provide sleek front-end and
monitoring features, pushing significant jobs like management, communication, computation, and
storage to trusted third parties, thereby raising privacy concerns [11].Deceptive and ambiguous
privacy policies trap users, allowing parties to sell information they collect to third party-managed
databases which might not have strong information security protocols in place. Session hijacking
attacks (cookie and session thefts, brute-force) that steal sensitive data flowing into the sink have
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also been studied [56]. Some WBS applications in the sinks grant permissions to other apps for
exchange or access to their information, which could pose a threat for BDI.Weak bonding policies
between the sink and its apps could pose a significant threat, causing external devicemis-bonding
attack (DMB) [157]. Additionally, JTAG-Read (R) and boundary scan based attacks have been
shown to access the memory of sinks, and allow adversaries to read the contents in its memory
[171]. Side-channel attacks such as differential power attack that monitor the power consumption
profile of the sink to steal secret keys have also been successfully conducted [114, 140, 146, 155].
Providing trust-based management for the transfer and storage of user-sensitive data is a
viable addition to secure communication channels [133, 144], as it limits data sharing to between
WBAN sensors which have a valid trust in each other. With trust revocation, the system main-
tains a time-variant dynamic trust model, generating flags when one of the sensors has failed to
establish trust with any other sensor in the same network. When one sensor is compromised, the
trust model altered as a consequence would flag an alert and island that sensor to avoid further
compromise [124]. Compartmentalization of wearable data has proven to be a good counter-
measure against thefts and frauds [190]. Designing wearable applications to store vital information
in segregated, encrypted, application-specific chunks restricts data replication. Data protection
makes sure critical applications run un-preempted, data is securely backed up and recoverable,
and allows administrators to map data and information flow between WBANs, sinks and cloud
without jeopardizing integrity and privacy [69, 210]. In defense to hijacking, BDI and JTAG-R, data
communication and storage protocol using two pseudo-random numbers generated through
symmetric and secret keys was proposed [170], its implementation focused more on WBS where
single-node WBAN and sink nodes are integrated into the same device. To counter DMB attacks,
an OS-level protection method called Dabinder was proposed to enforce secure bonding policies
whenever an app tried to establish Bluetooth connection or pair with the sink [157].
5.2.4 PR Threats, Attacks and Defenses. Most WBS today have feature extractor and matcher
modules located in the same device: a separate sink, or wearable itself. Considering, WBS operate
in noisy environments where other devices also communicate, signals are prone to noise and
interference, which demand more processing from feature extractors and matchers [106]. This
is in contrast with TBS that operate in controlled environments. More computation resources
increase attack surface, paving way for cryptanalytic attacks that target pseudorandom number
generators used by encryption methods in WBS [207]. Acoustic key search, electromagnetic attacks,
ciphertext, birthday, preimage, and key generation also come under this category.
Defending these attacks ranges from resetting sinks and erasing any trace of stored data, to more
advanced methods that look atmatch-level fusion of signals to increase complexity of an attack
to demotivate the adversary. Alternatively, extractor and matcher modules could be designed to
function in frequency-domain. Since signals measured by wearables are time-variant, they could
be directly correlated with owner’s activities. Transforming signals into frequency-domain and
using spectral analyses to operate on the features could make inference less explicit. The viability
of one-step two-factor authentication scheme was discussed for wearable biosensors in the
contexts of keystroke, EEG, hand geometry, and hand gesture [58]. Case-based reasoning could
be used between extractor-matcher modules and other associated modules of the sinks.
Key Takeaway Points: The following are the key takeaway points from this section:
(1) The literature on threats, attacks and defenses for TBS and WBS can be modality (M) or
Technology (T ) attacks, where T attacks can be System (Sys), Pattern Recognition (PR) or
Hybrid (H ) attacks for TBS, and Sys could be Sys-WBAN and Sys-Sink for WBS
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(2) All the attacks discussed impact confidentiality, integrity and/or availability of the modality
and/or template, and hence the privacy of users
(3) Physical attacks are harder to conduct on WBS than on TBS since the former employ
passive authentication and are more complexly networked together
(4) Systemic security measures such as adversarial machine learning and game theory could be
used to defensively learn adversary strategies and psychology before proactively resolving
the attacks
(5) Most of the attacks that target TBS and WBS tend to indirectly affect their performance,
especially factors like energy, network, and spectral efficiencies, and throughput/goodput,
which establishes a strong coupling between security concerns and performance
(6) Modality characteristics determine the impact of M attacks while performance metrics
determine that of T attacks. Security of TBS, on the other hand, depends on modality,
sample measured, template, and feature matching/decision-making
6 FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TOWBS DESIGN SOLUTIONS
Despite numerous WBS products already in the market and many more emerging, the design
considerations for WBS is still an evolving subject of research. Many principles impacting WBS
design have been identified:[55, 80, 138, 175]
• Human interaction with WBS could be in four ways: audio, visual, tactile and haptic [151].
These interaction modes, which form a fundamental aspect of WBS design solutions, are
influenced by different parameters like cognitive ease, cognitive overload, intuitiveness,
comprehension and perception
• With the WBS required to be always online and support passive authentication and/or
identification, the sensors generate ample amount of data over a given period of time. The
WBS design must account for not just data acquisition, but appropriate data management-
from sanitation, processing and storage to destruction. Some of the evaluation metric
factors discussed earlier like accuracy, energy and network efficiencies, will play key roles
in shaping WBS design with respect to its data handling requirements [175]
• Aesthetics have always been at the core of WBS, with designs catering to elegant, fashion-
conscious models that are powerful as well as easily wearable [55]. It is a significant
consideration, since a good design for WBS is a proper balance between the technology’s
intelligence and its appearance and user-friendliness
• The different WBS modality characteristics surveyed in Section 3 impact WBS design.
This is so, because every modality has its own properties (such as uniqueness, universal-
ity, permanence, acceptability and robustness against circumvention), requirements for
measurement (such as collectibility, susceptibility to interference from external signals
and ambient noise, and invasiveness) and constraints for processing and maintenance
(such as security, reliability, mobility and variability). The heterogeneity between different
modalities requires WBS design to be tweaked accordingly. For example, a WBS designed
to work on EEG might not be a good design for EMG or PPG
• As detailed in Section 4.2, different factors that impact WBS performance also contribute to
their design considerations. Physiology, number and placement of sensors, environmental
elements, and sensory heterogeneity affect the criteria for WBS designs
• Performance of WBS can be impacted by attacks, which affect security design aspects:
(1) Attacks that delay or corrupt the data packets within WBAN or WBAN-Sink commu-
nication could affect throughput and goodput, an unchecked manipulation of which
could result in faulted WBS that could even be life-threatening
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(2) The M class attacks have a strong coupling with the modality characteristics like
reliability, security and circumvention. They impact confidentiality and integrity
of sensitive data. Considering revoking biometrics is impossible (unless revocable
technology is fused with the system), a successful compromise can impact the system
performance and operations adversely
(3) DoS and other attacks that target the availability of data could drain the battery of
WBS or trigger excessive usage of critical resources like network bandwidth, causing
WBS to undergo preemptive shutdown that, in certain use-cases, could not only be
disruptive to system operation but also be fatal to the owner
(4) It is known that WBS are sensitive to external noises, considering their energy and
spectral efficiencies depend on them. However, jamming attacks distort the legitimate
signals by adding noise to impact WBS performance
• Many recent works have proposed novel WBS materials: stretchable silicon-based elas-
tomers like polydimethylsiloxane or Ecoflex for substrates and metal-based conductors for
electrodes [29]. They exhibit properties like biocompatibility, stretchability, conductivity,
malleability, ability to withstand strain and stress, and have a low failure rate
7 OPEN RESEARCH CHALLENGES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
WBS have proven their mettle in healthcare and fitness, but their security concerns in these domains
as well as when considered solely for authentication and identification purposes have significant
rooms for improvement [24, 63, 96, 136, 212]. Specifically, key open research areas in WBS are:
• Evolving security scape: The increased adoption of IoE principles into WBS will continue
to push boundaries in terms of signal processing, connectivity, data processing and man-
agement, measurement accuracy, convenience and aesthetics, but the constantly evolving
nature of attacks will pose a significant and persistent threat to their tech-scape. Recently,
the use of blockchain technology to store and analyze WBS data was explored to offer a
personalized healthcare for customers [126]. The approach used distributed ledger technol-
ogy and machine learning to store and access data of users in a secure manner. More work
is foreseen in areas that combine data analytics, cyber-physical security, and biometrics
• Changes to business models: With cloud and edge-based decentralized data analytics
becoming the norm for WBS, business models and intellectual property must be redefined
to adapt and support the relevant advancements in this newly redefined environment. WBS
are viewed as one of the first technologies that pave way for a customer-driven market
where choices of end-consumers drive the industries
• WBS Big Data: With increasing adoption of WBS by consumers, the number of sensors
collectively generating data will increase. Considering a single user can have a WBAN
of multiple sensors that are always online and ubiquitously churn new data periodically,
significant advances to manage, process and analyze the wealth of raw information in a
decentralized manner must be developed. The data thus generated will find multiple uses
ranging from consumer analytics to business intelligence and personalization of services
• Newer methods to leverage the power of emerging modalities such as voice, signature,
iris and human interactions have recently been explored. Hand-worn devices such as
smartwatches and fitness wear have been used to verify signatures and prevent frauds in
the financial sector. A study used voice recognition to perform two-factor authentication
on WBS [47]. This technology generates speech embedded with a random code that a
browser then plays. The signals are then captured by the WBS to perform authentication.
Google recently patented an iris scanning contact lens that uses the light reflected by the
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iris to perform authentication [10]. These technologies increase the likelihood that the
traditionally used modalities will now be exploited to solve the emerging challenges of
security and also not jeopardize user privacy and invasiveness
• Revision to policies: With changes in business models, policymaking follows. With con-
sumers demanding greater transparency, end-to-end analytics, peer-to-peer information
exchange, localized privacy-aware processing, and much more, restructuring of policies
and legislation will be inevitable
• Social behavior and acceptance: WBS are still viewed as invasive technologies by a majority
of consumers in the market. Hence, besides revisions to policies, social analytics and
acceptance testing through controlled experiments, surveys, interviews, awareness and
outreach must be conducted by the companies manufacturing WBS, thereby creating a
pipeline to gather consumer information from WBS data for offering personalized services
7.1 WBS Datasets and Access
To further the future research in WBS, data acquisition from different biometric modalities is
important. However, setting up devices, recruiting the right mix of participants, and gathering mea-
surements is not an easy task. This is where online data repositories come into importance. These
repositories include, but are not limited to, the UCI’s Machine Learning Repository, Kaggle, knowl-
edge discovery in datasets, KDNuggets, Wiley online repository, and even research repositories
such as the one hosted by the Biometrics Security Lab for the PPG datasets [67, 91, 102].
Although medical professionals have been collecting biometric data over years through clinical
trials, experiments, patient examinations and observations, the WBS have increased the rate of
data acquisition and the types of data being collected. This opens emerging challenges such as data
mining, minimizing signal-to-noise ratio, determining the length and persistence of data collection
and storage, respectively, for effective analysis and diagnosis of associated health risks in case
of fitness applications and being adaptive to potential consumer preference changes in case of
applications of leisure [177]. The lack of proper standardization to ensure data consistency, trust,
and integrity in interpretation and analysis is a challenge to gain insights from WBS datasets.
One of the key research gaps identified in [159] is obtaining intelligence for diagnosis from raw
WBS data without the involvement of human agents to manually parse and contextualize. Legal,
ethical, administrative and technical concerns have been identified as barriers to widespread use
of third party data collected by the above sources. The report also identifies the NIST Biometric
& Forensic Research Database Catalog that serves as a central repository for publicly available
biometric and forensic datasets [17]. Collaborative efforts by the U.S. Military Academy and the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) have also enabled the process of biometric
data measurement and collection, followed by dissemination. Wearable data acquisition and/or
access is still an emerging research problem with significant administrative, ethical, legal, and
technical implications that must be sorted out.
8 CONCLUSION
One of the important underpinning inferences visible from the emerging research in the area of
WBS is that their operational dynamics are different from those of TBS which have been available
in the market for a long time. Although the research community is aware of the key differences
between the two systems, the factors that contribute to these differences are not well researched,
summarized or discussed. To bridge this gap among the recent works of literature, this paper
conducts a comprehensive survey on three distinct but interdependent aspects of biometric systems:
the characteristics of modalities they use, the metrics used to evaluate their system performance,
and their security and privacy. Initially, to help appreciate the differences between TBS and WBS,
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the paper reviews and contrasts the above three aspects for both types of biometric systems with
equal emphasis. However, given the future research is geared more towards the security and privacy
concerns of WBS, the paper highlights how the design solutions to enhance security and privacy
are impacted by WBS modality characteristics and performance factors. Thereby, the survey is
aimed at not only summarizing, but also using the surveyed results to contribute to the literature a
clear understanding of the differences between TBS and WBS, advancements in WBS technology
and research, and the factors that impact their security and privacy design. It is inferred that
most modalities considered invasive in TBS could be powerful in the wearable environment. WBS
require additional metrics to measure their performance owing to their ubiquitous nature, and the
landscape of security is often different from that of TBS. In the end, open research challenges and
future directions for research in biometric systems was briefly discussed.
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